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A PRIMER ON OPPOSING CONSTRUCTION OF WIND
FARMS NEAR PUBLIC-USE AIRPORTS
ALAN ARMSTRONG*
ABSTRACT
We are witnessing an explosion in the construction of wind
turbine generators, cell phone towers, and television/radio
broadcast towers around the United States. The statutes, rules,
regulations, and police guidance addressing when and where
such structures can be erected near public-use airports are com-
plex and intricate. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
focuses more on subjective than objective criteria in assessing
whether an obstruction to air navigation is a hazard to air
navigation.
To the extent the FAA conducts studies to determine whether
an obstruction is a hazard, the courts are not uniform in assess-
ing the effects of FAA studies. In California, such studies have a
preemptive effect. In Iowa, they do not. This Article illuminates
this complex area of the law and assists the aviation practitioner
in navigating this intricate and bewildering area of the law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
WIND TURBINES GROUPED in wind farm projects are in-creasingly becoming part of the national landscape. The
construction of wind farm projects in the vicinity of public-use
airports can present airport operators and businesses on the air-
ports with an existential threat to the continued viability of the
airport. Principally, the construction of wind farm projects near
public-use airports can result in structures penetrating navigable
airspace.
This Article will review the statutes, regulations, policies, and
procedures that pertain to the airport operator’s duty to keep
the approaches and departures to and from the airport free of
obstructions in contrast to the inner workings of the Federal Avi-
ation Administration (FAA) Obstacle Evaluation Group (OEG),
which conducts aeronautical studies in rendering determina-
tions as to whether obstructions to navigable airspace are
hazards to air navigation. In many instances, the OEG will ini-
tially issue a Notice of Presumed Hazard (NPH) and then issue a
Determination of No Hazard (DNH) after conducting an aero-
nautical study. Litigation frequently follows an OEG DNH. Also,
this Article will examine the statutes, regulations, legal standards
and policies, and procedures employed by the courts in deter-
mining whether OEG determinations are controlling or
whether state or county authorities may prevent the construc-
tion of obstructions to air navigation notwithstanding an OEG
DNH. The Article will also examine several cases where the
courts determined that the OEG DNH were arbitrary and capri-
cious and were reversed.
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While the title of this Article specifically addresses wind farms,
the statutes, regulations, policies, and procedures discussed in
this Article will generally apply to other projects that obstruct
navigable airspace, such as radio broadcasting antennae and cell
phone towers.
II. THE VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF NAVIGABLE
AIRSPACE
According to the FAA:
The navigable airspace is a limited national resource. Naviga-
ble airspace is defined as the airspace at or above the minimum
altitudes of flight that includes the airspace needed to ensure
safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft. Congress has
charged the FAA with administering this airspace in the public
interest as necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and its effi-
cient use.
All proposed development on public-use airport property is
subject to an airport airspace analysis (AAA) and is commonly
processed as a non-rulemaking airport (NRA) case regardless of
Federal funding participation. The appropriate FAA regional
Airports Division is responsible for initiating the coordination of
NRA aeronautical studies, which consist of:
• Evaluating the effect of the construction or alteration on
existing and planned operating procedures
• Determining the potential hazardous effect of the pro-
posed construction on air navigation
• Identifying mitigating measures to enhance safe air
navigation[.]
Under Federal Regulation Title 14 Part 77, Safe, Efficient Use
and Preservation of the Navigable Airspace (Part 77), which
went into effect on January 18, 2011, an AAA is not conducted
for private-use airports unless the airport is operated by a Fed-
eral agency or the Department of Defense . . . , or if the private-
use airport has at least one FAA-approved instrument approach
procedure. Private-use airports are subject to the notification re-
quirements under Part 157, Notice of Construction, Alteration,
Activation, and Deactivation of Airports.1
The foregoing definition by the FAA makes it clear that navi-
gable airspace must extend low enough to protect aircraft from
1 Airport Airspace Analysis (AAA), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/
airports/engineering/airspace_analysis/ [https://perma.cc/JUY8-PTKM] (Mar.
16, 2021, 9:37 AM).
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obstructions during takeoff and landing. Altitude values may be
expressed either in terms of feet above ground level (AGL) or
feet above mean sea level (MSL).2 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(c) pro-
vides that even over non-congested areas, aircraft may be oper-
ated at “[a]n altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over
open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases, the air-
craft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person,
vessel, vehicle, or structure.”3 Irrespective of aircraft require-
ments for takeoff and landing, navigable airspace extends down
to an altitude of 500 feet above the surface over non-congested
areas.4 Furthermore, helicopters may be flown even lower than
500 feet AGL, because 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d) provides:
If the operation is conducted without hazard to persons or prop-
erty on the surface—(1) [a] helicopter may be operated at less
than the minimums prescribed in paragraph (b) or (c) of this
section, provided each person operating the helicopter complies
with any routes or altitudes specifically prescribed for helicopters
by the FAA . . . .5
Aircraft may be operated under either instrument flight rules
(IFR) or visual flight rules (VFR).6 Aircraft operating under IFR
may conduct an instrument approach procedure (IAP).7 A non-
precision instrument approach procedure will have a minimum
descent altitude (MDA), which is an altitude below which the
aircraft cannot be operated unless the aircraft’s pilot has visual
reference to the runway.8 It is not uncommon for non-precision
instrument approach procedures to have a minimum descent
altitude that is approximately 500 feet AGL. Precision ap-
proaches have decision altitudes or decision heights, which is
2 E.g., What’s the Difference Between MSL and AGL? Here’s How You Tell. . ., PILOT
INSTITUTE (Feb. 20, 2020), https://pilotinstitute.com/msl-vs-agl/ [https://
perma.cc/ST8V-DXWS].
3 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(c) (2021).
4 See id.
5 Id. § 91.119(d)(1).
6 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA-H-8083-15B, INSTRUMENT FLYING HANDBOOK
G-9, G-20 (2012), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/hand-
books_manuals/aviation/media/FAA-H-8083-15B.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PKU-
FAP9].
7 See id. at G-9.
8 “Minimum descent altitude . . . or minimum descent height . . . [is a] specified
altitude or height in a 2D instrument approach operation or circling approach
operation below which descent must not be made without the required visual
reference.” INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., ANNEX 6 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CIVIL AVIATION, OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT, PART I — INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT — AEROPLANES 1-8 (11th ed. 2018).
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“[a] specified altitude or height in a 3D instrument approach
operation at which a missed approach must be initiated if the
required visual reference to continue the approach has not
been established.”9 Aircraft operated under IFR and conducting
a precision approach may be 200 feet or lower AGL when con-
ducting an instrument approach procedure.10 Thus, the impor-
tance of protecting navigable airspace so that aircraft may take
off from and land at airports in fog and clouds is readily
apparent.
III. A REVIEW OF PART 77 OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION
REGULATIONS
Pilots approaching to land at an airport in fog and cloud must
be able to descend to the airport without the danger of striking
a fixed object or structure. For that reason, the FAA promul-
gated 14 C.F.R. Part 77, which deals with protecting navigable
airspace from obstructions so that airmen landing aircraft or de-
parting from airports in poor weather may do so without fear of
striking structures, such as wind turbines.
The importance of keeping navigable airspace clear and free
of obstructions is so significant that airport sponsors who own
and operate public-use airports are required to give a covenant
to the FAA in the form of FAA Sponsor Grant Assurances.11 FAA
Sponsor Grant Assurance No. 20 provides:
[The airport operator] will take appropriate action to assure that
such terminal airspace as is required to protect instrument and
visual operations to the airport (including established minimum
safe altitudes) will be adequately cleared and protected by remov-
ing, lowering, relocating, marking, or lighting or otherwise miti-
gating existing airport hazards and by preventing the
establishment or creation of future airport hazards.12
The reason airport operators are required to keep navigable air-
space clear and free of obstructions is self-evident. Public-use air-
ports receiving federal funds must be safe for operation, which
is why the FAA imposes on the airport operator the obligations
9 Id. at 1-3.
10 See id. at 4-6 (describing the Type B instrument approach operation
categories).
11 See 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a).
12 Assurances: Airport Sponsors, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/air-
ports/aip/grant_assurances/ [https://perma.cc/58MR-ZECR] (June 4, 2020)
(click “Airport Sponsors (2/2020)”).
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set forth in Grant Assurance No. 20.13 By statute, operators of
public-use airports are required to ensure that terminal airspace
is clear of hazards.14 Further, the airport operator must ensure
land near the airport is compatible with normal airport opera-
tions.15 This may be accomplished by the adoption of zoning
laws.16
Proponents and developers of wind turbines and other struc-
tures in the vicinity of public-use airports must give notice to the
FAA by completing an FAA Form 7460–1 Notice of Proposed
Construction or Alteration “at least 45 days before the start date
of the proposed construction or alteration or the date an appli-
cation for a construction permit is filed, whichever is earliest.”17
The duty to give notice to the FAA is triggered if the construc-
tion or alteration will penetrate a 100:1 horizontal plane for a
distance of 20,000 feet “from the nearest point of the nearest
runway of each airport described in paragraph (d) of [14 C.F.R.
§ 77.9] with its longest runway more than 3,200 ft. in actual
length, excluding heliports.”18 According to 14 C.F.R. § 77.5(c),
the information contained in the FAA Form 7460–1 is used to:
(1)  Evaluate the effect of the proposed construction or altera-
tion on safety in air commerce and the efficient use and preserva-
tion of the navigable airspace and of airport traffic capacity at
public use airports;
(2)  Determine whether the effect of proposed construction or
alteration is a hazard to air navigation;
(3)  Determine appropriate marking and lighting recommenda-
tions, using FAA Advisory Circular 70/7460–1, Obstruction
Marking and Lighting;
(4)  Determine other appropriate measures to be applied for
continued safety of air navigation; and
(5)  Notify the aviation community of the construction or altera-
tion of objects that affect the navigable airspace, including the
revision of charts, when necessary.19
13 See id. (“The airport and all facilities which are necessary to serve the aero-
nautical users of the airport, other than facilities owned or controlled by the
United States, shall be operated at all times in a safe and serviceable condition
and in accordance with the minimum standards as may be required or prescribed
by applicable Federal, state and local agencies for maintenance and operation.”).
14 See 49 U.S.C § 47107(a)(9).
15 See id. § 47107(a)(10).
16 Id.
17 14 C.F.R. § 77.7(a)–(b) (2021).
18 Id. § 77.9(b)(1).
19 Id. § 77.5(c)(1)–(5).
2021] PRIMER ON OPPOSING CONSTRUCTION 349
14 C.F.R. §77.11 requires the proponent of the wind farm or
structure to file a supplemental notice with the FAA when “[t]he
construction or alteration is more than 200 feet in height AGL
at its site.”20 When the proponent of the wind farm or other
proposed structures files Form 7460–1, the FAA must evaluate
the data in the form.21
The criteria the FAA is supposed to use to evaluate the form
are set forth in 14 C.F.R. § 77.15 as follows:
(a)  This subpart describes standards used to determine obstruc-
tions to air navigation that may affect the safe and efficient use of
navigable airspace and the operation of planned or existing air
navigation and communication facilities. Such facilities include
air navigation aids, communication equipment, airports, Federal
airways, instrument approach or departure procedures, and ap-
proved off-airway routes.
(b)  Objects that are considered obstructions under the stan-
dards described in this subpart are presumed hazards to air navi-
gation unless further aeronautical study concludes that the
object is not a hazard. Once further aeronautical study has been
initiated, the FAA will use the standards in this subpart, along
with FAA policy and guidance material, to determine if the ob-
ject is a hazard to air navigation.22
“Imaginary surfaces” are defined and explained in 14 C.F.R.
§ 77.19 as follows:
The following civil airport imaginary surfaces are established with
relation to the airport and to each runway. The size of each such
imaginary surface is based on the category of each runway ac-
cording to the type of approach available or planned for that
runway. The slope and dimensions of the approach surface ap-
plied to each end of a runway are determined by the most pre-
cise approach procedure existing or planned for that runway
end.23
20 Id. § 77.11(a)(1).
21 See id. § 77.15(c).
The standards in this subpart apply to construction or alteration
proposals on an airport (including heliports and seaplane bases
with marked lanes) if that airport is one of the following before the
issuance of the final determination: (1) [a]vailable for public use
and is listed in the Airport/Facility Directory, Supplement Alaska,
or Supplement Pacific of the U.S. Government Flight Information
Publications . . . .
Id. § 77.15(e)(1).
22 Id. § 77.15(a)–(b).
23 Id. § 77.19.
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There are five principal imaginary surfaces: (1) a horizontal sur-
face, (2) a conical surface, (3) a primary surface, (4) an ap-
proach surface, and (5) a transitional surface.24 A horizontal
surface is defined as follows:
(a) A horizontal plane 150 feet above the established airport ele-
vation, the perimeter of which is constructed by [sw]inging arcs
of a specified radii from the center of each end of the primary
surface of each runway of each airport and connecting the adja-
cent arcs by lines tangent to those arcs. The radius of each arc is:
(1) 5,000 feet for all runways designated as utility or visual;
(2) 10,000 feet for all other runways. The radius of the arc
specified for each end of a runway will have the same arithmet-
ical value. That value will be the highest determined for either
end of the runway. When a 5,000-foot arc is encompassed by
tangents connecting two adjacent 10,000-foot arcs, the 5,000-
foot arc shall be disregarded on the construction of the perim-
eter of the horizontal surface.25
A conical surface is defined as “[a] surface extending outward
and upward from the periphery of the horizontal surface at a
slope of 20 to 1 for a horizontal distance of 4,000 feet.”26 A pri-
mary surface is defined as follows:
A surface longitudinally centered on a runway. When the runway
has a specially prepared hard surface, the primary surface ex-
tends 200 feet beyond each end of that runway; but when the
runway has no specially prepared hard surface, the primary sur-
face ends at each end of that runway. The elevation of any point
on the primary surface is the same as the elevation of the nearest
point on the runway centerline. The width of the primary surface
is:
(1)  250 feet for utility runways having only visual approaches.
(2)  500 feet for utility runways having non-precision instru-
ment approaches.
(3) For other than utility runways, the width is:
(i)  500 feet for visual runways having only visual
approaches.
(ii)  500 feet for non-precision instrument runways having
visibility minimums greater than three-fourths statute
mile.
(iii)  1,000 feet for a non-precision instrument runway hav-
ing a non-precision instrument approach with visibility
24 See id. § 77.19(a)–(e).
25 Id. § 77.19(a).
26 Id. § 77.19(b).
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minimums as low as three-fourths of a statute mile, and for
precision instrument runways.
(iv)  The width of the primary surface of a runway will be
that width prescribed in this section for the most precise
approach existing or planned for either end of that
runway.27
An approach surface is defined as follows:
A surface longitudinally centered on the extended runway cen-
terline and extending outward and upward from each end of the
primary surface. An approach surface is applied to each end of
each runway based upon the type of approach available or
planned for that runway end.
(1) The inner edge of the approach surface is the same width
as the primary surface and it expands uniformly to a width
of:
(i)  1,250 feet for that end of a utility runway with only
visual approaches;
(ii)  1,500 feet for that end of a runway other than a utility
runway with only visual approaches;
(iii)  2,000 feet for that end of a utility runway with a non-
precision instrument approach;
(iv)  3,500 feet for that end of a non-precision instrument
runway other than utility, having visibility minimums
greater tha[n] three-fourths of a statute mile;
(v)  4,000 feet for that end of a non-precision instrument
runway, other than utility, having a non-precision instru-
ment approach with visibility minimums as low as three-
fourths statute mile; and
(vi)  16,000 feet for precision instrument runways.
(2)  The approach surface extends for a horizontal distance of:
(i)  5,000 feet at a slope of 20 to 1 for all utility and visual
runways;
(ii)  10,000 feet at a slope of 34 to 1 for all non-precision
instrument runways other than utility; and
(iii)  10,000 feet at a slope of 50 to 1 with an additional
40,000 feet at a slope of 40 to 1 for all precision instru-
ment runways.
(3)  The outer width of an approach surface to an end of a
runway will be that width prescribed in this subsection for the
most precise approach existing or planned for that runway
end.28
27 Id. § 77.19(c).
28 Id. § 77.19(d).
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Finally, there is a transitional surface, which is defined as
follows:
These surfaces extend outward and upward at right angles to the
runway centerline and the runway centerline extended at a slope
of 7 to 1 from the sides of the primary surface and from the sides
of the approach surfaces. Transitional surfaces for those portions
of the precision approach surface which project through and be-
yond the limits of the conical surface, extend a distance of 5,000
feet measured horizontally from the edge of the approach sur-
face and at right angles to the runway centerline.29
The governing FAA obstruction standards are found in
14 C.F.R. § 77.17, which provides, inter alia:
(a)  An existing object, including a mobile object is, and a future
object would be an obstruction to air navigation if it is of greater
height than any of the following heights or surfaces:
(1)  A height of 499 feet AGL at the site of the object.
(2)  A height that is 200 feet AGL, or above the established
airport elevation, whichever is higher, within 3 nautical miles
of the established reference point of an airport, excluding heli-
ports, with its longest runway more than 3,200 feet in actual
length, and that height increases in the proportion of 100 feet
for each additional nautical mile from the airport up to a max-
imum of 499 feet.
(3)  A height within a terminal obstacle clearance area, includ-
ing an initial approach segment, a departure area, and a cir-
cling approach area, which would result in the vertical distance
between any point on the object and an established minimum
instrument flight altitude within that area or segment to be less
than the required obstacle clearance.
(4)  A height within an en route obstacle clearance area, in-
cluding turn and termination areas, of a Federal Airway or ap-
proved off-airway route, that would increase the minimum
obstacle clearance altitude.
(5)  The surface of a takeoff and landing area of an airport or
any imaginary surface established under § 77.19, 77.21, or
77.23. However, no part of the takeoff or landing area itself
will be considered an obstruction.30
IV. THE FAA AERONAUTICAL STUDY
Generally, the FAA will issue an NPH after the filing of an
FAA Form 7460–1. The NPH may note that the proposed struc-
29 Id. § 77.19(e).
30 Id. § 77.17(a).
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ture will require an increase in the MDA for an IAP, will pene-
trate the 40:1 obstacle identification surface for aircraft
departing from the runway serviced by a precision instrument
approach procedure, or will penetrate the 34:1 approach sur-
face for a non-precision instrument approach to a runway.31
There are numerous possibilities for penetrations of navigable
airspace by virtue of the “imaginary surfaces” described above.
In response to the filing of a 7460–1, the FAA routinely issues an
NPH. However, invariably, the NPH invites the sponsor of the
construction or structure to seek an aeronautical study, which
may result in a DNH issuance.32
The statutory criteria for conducting an aeronautical study
are set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1), which requires the Sec-
retary of Transportation to:
(A)  consider factors relevant to the efficient and effective use of
the navigable airspace, including—
(i)  the impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures
for aircraft operating under visual flight rules;
(ii)  the impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures
for aircraft operating under instrument flight rules;
(iii)  the impact on existing public-use airports and aeronauti-
cal facilities;
(iv)  the impact on planned public-use airports and aeronauti-
cal facilities;
(v)  the cumulative impact resulting from the proposed con-
struction or alteration of a structure when combined with the
impact of other existing or proposed structures;
(vi)  the impact on launch and reentry for launch and reentry
vehicles arriving or departing from a launch site or reentry site
licensed by the Secretary of Transportation; and
(vii)  other factors relevant to the efficient and effective use of
navigable airspace . . . .33
Upon completion of the aeronautical study, the Secretary of
Transportation is required to issue a report disclosing the “ad-
verse impact on the safe and efficient use of the navigable air-
space that the Secretary finds will result from constructing or
altering the structure and . . . unacceptable risk to the national
31 See, e.g., Tooele Valley Airport Overlay Zone Ordinance Draft and Recommendation,
TOOELE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.utah.gov/
pmn/files/746685.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2B7-97QX].
32 See 14 C.F.R. § 77.31(d).
33 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1)(A).
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security of the United States, as determined by the Secretary of
Defense under [49 U.S.C. § 44718(f)].”34
The regulatory counterpart of 49 U.S.C. § 44718 is 14 C.F.R.
§ 77.29, which calls for the FAA to evaluate:
(1)  The impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures
for aircraft operating under visual flight rules;
(2)  The impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures
for aircraft operating under instrument flight rules;
(3)  The impact on existing and planned public use airports;
(4)  Airport traffic capacity of existing public use airports and
public use airport development plans received before the issu-
ance of the final determination;
(5)  Minimum obstacle clearance altitudes, minimum instrument
flight rules altitudes, approved or planned instrument approach
procedures, and departure procedures;
(6)  The potential effect on ATC radar, direction finders, ATC
tower line-of-sight visibility, and physical or electromagnetic ef-
fects on air navigation, communication facilities, and other sur-
veillance systems;
(7)  The aeronautical effects resulting from the cumulative im-
pact of a proposed construction or alteration of a structure when
combined with the effects of other existing or proposed
structures.35
In addition to following the guidelines in 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)
and 14 C.F.R. § 77.29(a), the FAA OEG must also follow the Pro-
cedures for Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Order JO 7400.2N
(the “Handbook”).36
Before analyzing the Handbook, it is important to remember
that there are objective, scientific criteria for evaluating hazards
to air navigation by virtue of the myriad of regulations and FAA
Orders discussed above. According to the FAA standards,
“[o]bjects that are considered obstructions under the standards
described in this subpart are presumed hazards to air navigation
unless further aeronautical study concludes that the object is
not a hazard.”37 The obstruction standards are set out in detail
in 14 C.F.R. § 77.17. There are at least five imaginary surfaces
designed by the FAA to identify obstructions and to prevent air-
34 Id. § 44718(b)(2).
35 14 C.F.R. § 77.29(a)(1)–(7) (2021).
36 See generally Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Order JO
7400.2N (June 17, 2021) [hereinafter Handbook], https://www.faa.gov/docu-
mentLibrary/media/Order/7400.2N_Bsc_dtd_6_17_21.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5ZAF-N5P7].
37 14 C.F.R. § 77.15(b).
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craft colliding with those obstructions: (1) the horizontal sur-
face; (2) the conical surface; (3) the primary surface; (4)
approach surfaces which may consist of either precision or non-
precision approaches; and (5) the transitional surfaces that ex-
tend upward and outward from the runway centerline at a slope
of seven to one.38 Additionally, the design standards for public-
use airports are set forth in FAA Advisory Circular 150/5300-
13A, which recognizes imaginary surface requirements to sepa-
rate aircraft from structures.39 Further, 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(c)
forbids the operation of aircraft below “[a]n altitude of 500 feet
above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated
areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer
than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.”40 Fi-
nally, the Aeronautical Information Manual provides for a 40:1
obstacle identification surface that begins at the departure end
of the runway to keep obstructions out of the aircraft’s flight
path.41
The scientific and objective criteria that went into developing
the foregoing regulations, orders, and standards is largely viti-
ated by the Handbook that substitutes subjective standards in
lieu of objective standards to ensure air safety. For example, Sec-
tion 7.1.1 of the Handbook requires the issuance of a determi-
nation of hazard only if there is a “substantial physical or
electromagnetic adverse effect [upon navigable airspace or air
navigation facilities].”42 The Handbook calls for issuing several
responses to an obstruction evaluation such as a “Does Not Ex-
ceed” determination (automated DNE letter),43 an “Exceeds But
Okay” (automated EBO letter),44 a “Notice of Preliminary Find-
ings” (automated NPF letter),45 a “Determination of No Hazard”
(DNH),46 and a “Determination of Hazard” (DOH).47 The pre-
38 See supra note 24.
39 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 150/5300-13A, AIRPORT DE-
SIGN (2014), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/
150-5300-13A-chg1-interactive-201907.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KPQ-C3MS].
40 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(c).
41 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, CHAPTER 5: AIR
TRAFFIC PROCEDURES § 2, para. 5-2-9(e)(3) (2021), https://www.faa.gov/
Air_traffic/Publications/atpubs/aim_html/
chap5_section_2.html#2I2s71315Chri [https://perma.cc/2RU9-QZNX].
42 Handbook, supra note 36, § 7-1-1 (emphasis added).
43 Id. § 7-1-3(a).
44 Id. § 7-1-3(b).
45 Id. § 7-1-3(c).
46 Id. § 7-1-3(d).
47 Id. § 7-1-3(e).
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ceding letters are replete with language about the FAA entering
into “negotiations” with the proponent of the potential hazard
to air navigation.48 For instance, “[i]f negotiation is successful,
and resolution is achieved, or further study is completed, an ap-
propriate subsequent determination should be issued.”49 In the
event of a DOH, “the structure would have or has a substantial
adverse effect; [and] negotiations with the sponsor have been un-
successful in eliminating the substantial adverse effect . . . .”50
To oppose the construction of obstructions near a public-use
airport, a person should demonstrate to the court that the crite-
ria dealing with obstructions to air navigation have not been sat-
isfied. Such criteria should include that set out in Section 7-1-
3(e) of the Handbook, which calls for the issuance of a DOH “if
the structure would have or has a substantial adverse effect.”51
Remember, the purported objective of the FAA in conducting
obstruction evaluation studies is “to ensure the safety of air navi-
gation, and the efficient utilization of navigable airspace by air-
craft.”52 According to the scope for obstruction evaluation
studies as set forth in the Handbook, “[a] structure that exceeds
one or more of these standards is presumed to be a hazard to air
navigation unless the aeronautical study determines other-
wise.”53 Furthermore, the FAA must consider the effect the
structure would have on existing and proposed public-use air-
ports; VFR and IFR flight operations; airport capacity; and
“physical, electromagnetic, or line-of-sight interference on ex-
isting or proposed air navigation, communications, radar, and
control systems facilities.”54 According to the Handbook, there
will be an adverse effect if an obstruction exceeds the Part 77
standards and requires “a change to an existing or planned IFR
minimum flight altitude” or will require “a VFR operation[ ] to
change its regular flight course or altitude.”55
Importantly, “one or more aeronautical operations per day”56
could be a significant volume of activity to decide on a hazard.
48 See, e.g., id. § 7-1-3(c) (“The NPH facilitates negotiations and is useful in
preserving navigable airspace.”).
49 Id.
50 Id. § 7-1-3(e) (emphasis added).
51 Id.
52 Id. § 6-3-1(a).
53 Id. § 6-3-2.
54 See id. § 6-3-2(a).
55 Id. § 6-3-3(a)–(b).
56 Id. § 6-3-4.
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According to the Handbook, there is a substantial adverse effect
if the following is found:
A proposed structure would have, or an existing structure has, a
substantial adverse effect if it causes electromagnetic interfer-
ence to the operation of an air navigation facility or the signal
used by aircraft, or if there is a combination of:
(a)  Adverse effect as described in paragraph 6-3-3; and
(b)  A significant volume of aeronautical operations, as de-
scribed in paragraph 6-3-4, would be affected.57
Accordingly, if there is a requirement to change an IFR mini-
mum flight altitude or a VFR regular flight course or altitude
under Part 77 obstruction standards and if “one or more aero-
nautical operations per day would be affected,”58 then persons
or entities opposing the erection of a wind farm or other struc-
ture might successfully demonstrate to the court that the struc-
ture would constitute a “substantial adverse effect” under the
Handbook.59
Additional language that is helpful to opponents of wind
farms and other structures may be found in Section 6-3-8 of the
Handbook, which provides as follows:
(a)  PURPOSE. These guidelines are for use in determining the
effect of structures, whether proposed or existing, upon VFR aer-
onautical operations in the navigable airspace. The intent of
these guidelines is to provide a basis for analytical judgments in
evaluating the effect of structures on VFR operations.
(b)  CONSIDERATIONS.
(1)  Minimum VFR Flight Altitudes. Minimum VFR flight alti-
tudes are prescribed by regulation. Generally speaking, from a
VFR standpoint, the navigable airspace includes all airspace
500 feet AGL or greater and that airspace below 500 feet re-
quired for:
(a)  Takeoff and landing, including the airport traffic
pattern.
(b)  Flight over open water and sparsely populated areas (an
aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any per-
son, vessel, vehicle, or structure).
(c)  Helicopter operations when the operation may be con-
ducted without hazard to persons and property on the
surface.
57 Id. § 6-3-5.
58 See id. § 6-3-4.
59 See id. § 6-3-5.
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(2)  VFR Weather Minimums. Proposed or existing structures po-
tentially have the greatest impact in those areas where VFR oper-
ations are conducted when ceiling and/or visibility conditions
are at or near VFR weather minimums. Any structure that would
interfere with a significant volume of low altitude flights by actu-
ally excluding or restricting VFR operations in a specific area
would have a substantial adverse effect and may be considered a
hazard to air navigation.60
If the structure will have an adverse effect on IFR operations, a
review of Section 6-3-9 of the Handbook is indicated because it
provides, inter alia:
Departure Procedures. TERPS, Chapter 12, Civil Utilization of
Area Navigation (RNAV) Departure Procedures, contains criteria
for the development of IFR departure procedures. An obstacle
that penetrates the 40:1 departure slope is considered to be an
obstruction to air navigation. Further study is required to deter-
mine if adverse effect exists. Any proposed obstacle that pene-
trates the 40:1 departure slope, originating at the departure end
of runway (DER) by up to 35 feet will be circularized. If an obsta-
cle penetrates the 40:1 departure slope by more than 35 feet, it is
presumed to be a hazard, and a Notice of Presumed Hazard will
be issued, and processed accordingly. Analysis by the Terminal
Procedures and Charting Group and air traffic personnel is nec-
essary to determine if there would be a substantial adverse effect
on the navigable airspace.61
V. APPEALS OF FAA FINAL ORDERS TO THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEAL
A. STANDING AND SEEKING STAYS OF THE FAA FINAL ORDER
If the proposed structure has the potential for creating elec-
tromagnetic interference, those adverse effects must be identi-
fied and stated,62 and “[t]echnical operations services personnel
must evaluate notices to determine if the structure will affect the
performance of existing or proposed [National Airspace Sys-
tem] facilities.”63
If the FAA or the OEG initially issues an NPH followed by a
DNH, persons or entities opposing the latter may petition for
review before the FAA within thirty days of the issuance of the
60 Id. § 6-3-8(a), (b)(1)–(2).
61 Id. § 6-3-9(e)(4).
62 Id. § 6-3-10(a).
63 Id. § 6-3-10(b).
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DNH.64 In the event the FAA or the OEG issues a final order
affirming the DNH, then the opponents to the wind farm or
structure have sixty days to file a petition for review with a
United States Court of Appeals, either for the circuit in which
the airport or project is located or in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.65 For persons or
entities opposing the construction of the wind farm or structure
to be heard on their appeal, they must demonstrate they have
standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution; the elements
of standing are: “(1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redres-
sability.”66 Counsel representing persons or entities opposed to
the construction of wind turbines near a public-use airport
should anticipate that counsel for FAA will argue the persons or
entities lack standing. Such an argument was raised in Clark
County v. FAA where the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit rejected the argument and stated,
“[i]n sum, the FAA’s standing argument is meritless—akin to
arguing that homeowners have no standing to object to federal
approval of a toxic dump or dam being built in their
neighborhood.”67
Similarly, in Town of Barnstable v. FAA (Barnstable I), the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit found standing concerning 130 identical Determinations of
No Hazard for wind turbines.68 There, the petitioners demon-
strated that if the FAA changed its position and issued a Deter-
mination of Hazard, it was likely that the Interior Department
would reverse its position and not grant a lease to the propo-
nents of the wind farm construction.69 If petitioners are seeking
to reverse an FAA final agency decision upholding a Determina-
tion of No Hazard desire to stay the effectiveness of the final
order, then they will need to petition the FAA to stay the final
order.70 If the FAA denies the petition, the petitioners will need
to file a motion to stay the final order with the appropriate
United States Court of Appeals.71
64 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 77.35, 77.39(a) (2021).
65 See 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a).
66 Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
67 522 F.3d 437, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).
68 659 F.3d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
69 Id. at 32.
70 See FED. R. APP. P. 18(a)(1).
71 See FED. R. APP. P. 18(a)(2).
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B. SCOPE OF REVIEW
The scope of review by the circuit courts of appeal of an FAA
final order is limited. Generally speaking, under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), the various courts of appeal apply an
arbitrary and capricious standard, and agency determinations
will be upheld “so long as the agency ‘engaged in reasoned deci-
sionmaking and its decision is adequately explained and sup-
ported by the record.’”72
C. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS FINDING THE FAA ACTED IN AN
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER
In Clark County v. FAA, Clark County, Nevada, petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit for judicial review of an FAA final order, which declared
that a proposed wind farm would not obstruct airspace near the
proposed airport or pose a hazard by interfering with radar sys-
tems at the new airport.73 As previously noted, the FAA initially
argued that Clark County lacked standing, an argument the cir-
cuit court found to be “meritless.”74 The court found that there
was injury-in-fact because “the proposed wind turbines would
pose a hazard to planes flying near its planned airport
and . . . the turbines would interfere with radar units at the air-
port.”75 The court also found the requirement for redressability
was satisfied because “a hazard determination by the FAA would
preclude construction.”76 Nevada is one of the jurisdictions that
apparently “follows” the FAA decision about whether there is a
determination of hazard or no hazard. A lengthier discussion of
this topic appears below.
The circuit court cited 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1), remarking
that the question of the aeronautical study was whether the con-
struction of the wind turbines would “result in an obstruction of
the navigable airspace or an interference with air navigation fa-
cilities and equipment or the navigable airspace.”77 The court
found that the “FAA conducted the aeronautical studies under
its Part 77 regulations governing ‘objects affecting navigable air-
72 Clark Cnty., 522 F.3d at 441 (citation omitted); see also Administrative Proce-
dure Act § 10(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
73 Clark Cnty., 522 F.3d at 438.
74 Id. at 440.
75 Id.
76 Id. (citing CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE § 30.56.070(c) (2021)).
77 Id. at 439 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1)).
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space’ and its procedural handbook for Part 77 studies.”78 But it
determined that “the FAA did not conduct formal, on-the-re-
cord hearings; rather, its ‘Does Not Exceed’ determinations
were the product of informal adjudication. We review these infor-
mal adjudicatory determinations under the APA to determine
whether they are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.’”79
The court specifically referred to paragraph 6-3-9(e)(4) of
FAA Order 7400.2F, which “requir[es] [the] FAA to issue [a]
Notice of Presumed Hazard when [the] structure penetrates
[the] 40:1 departure slope by more than 35 feet.”80 While the
FAA official who issued the “Does Not Exceed” determinations
found that there were “‘no Part 77 penetrations—clear as a bell’
and that there ‘[were] NO Part 77 penetrations within this pro-
ject area,’”81 the court observed that “[t]he 40:1 Reports in the
record here indicate that the wind turbines would significantly
penetrate the 40:1 slope for runways at the Ivanpah Airport
(and at the nearby Henderson Airport, which serves general-avi-
ation traffic).”82 The court could not reconcile the conclusions
of the FAA employee who found that there were no Part 77 pen-
etrations with the 40:1 reports that showed the wind turbines
would significantly penetrate the 40:1 departure slope.83 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that “the FAA’s determinations d[id]
not satisfy the APA’s reasoned decisionmaking requirement with
respect to the agency’s Part 77 obstruction standards.”84
In addition to the court’s finding that the FAA had not en-
gaged in reasoned decision-making, the court also accepted a
submitted analysis by ASRC Aerospace Corporation, which re-
vealed that the wind turbines “will likely show up on the [radar]
display of air traffic control”85 and “each wind turbine has a ra-
dar ‘signature approximately that of a jumbo jet.’”86 The court
also weighed in the FAA Airway Facilities Division objection to
the wind turbines due to their proximity to air traffic radar facil-
78 Id. (citing Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Order 7400.2F
(Feb. 16, 2006), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/
7400.2F%20CHG%203.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL3D-MDLY]).
79 Id. at 441.
80 Id. at 442.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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ities and the FAA Flight Procedures Office’s conclusion that the
wind turbines could have an adverse impact on air navigation
facilities.87 Finally, the FAA Flight Procedures Office declared in
an email to the FAA Obstacle Evaluation Service that “ ‘[h]istory
has borne out the fact that wind turbines can impact RADAR
and other’ navigational aids, and the wind turbine project needs
‘to be brought to the attention of’ the FAA’s Airports Divi-
sion.”88 In light of the foregoing facts, the court reversed the
FAA’s final order because the order did not satisfy the reasoned
decision-making requirements of the APA.89
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Clark County v. FAA illustrates the
atrocious lack of care the FAA OEG can employ in issuing a de-
termination of no hazard. Again, in that case, there was clear,
scientific, and empirical evidence in the record that the pro-
posed turbines would penetrate the 40:1 departure slope, but
the FAA concluded otherwise with no factual basis for its opin-
ion. Unfortunately, this lack of care in issuing no hazard deter-
minations is not the exception. It is the norm.
In Barnstable I, the town of Barnstable, Massachusetts, and a
non-profit organization of private citizens and other organiza-
tions petitioned for a review of the FAA DNHs issued for the
construction of 130 wind turbines in Nantucket Sound.90 In con-
ducting its analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit specifically considered language in
49 U.S.C. § 44718(b), where the criterion of the study is sup-
posed to be whether the project would “result in an obstruction
of the navigable airspace or an interference with air navigation
facilities and equipment or the navigable airspace.”91 Once
again, the FAA challenged the petitioners’ standing to bring the
petition for review, claiming the Interior Department had juris-
diction over whether to issue a lease to the proponents of the
wind farm.92 The court noted, however, that the Interior Depart-
ment “gave its blessing to the FAA to impose any future mitiga-
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 443.
90 Town of Barnstable v. FAA (Barnstable I), 659 F.3d 28, 30–31 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
91 Id. at 30.
92 See id. at 31–32 (“[T]he FAA’s hazard determinations, by themselves, have
‘no enforceable legal effect.’ . . . The Interior Department . . . is the ultimate
arbiter.”).
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tion measures that the FAA might deem necessary to reduce or
eliminate a hazard on Cape Wind, and to do so without any fur-
ther consultation.”93 The court further noted that the Interior
Department “would take an FAA finding of hazard very, very se-
riously.”94 Finally, the Interior Department “conditioned any
start of construction on receipt of a final FAA determination.”95
Based on this record, the court found the petitioners demon-
strated standing to bring the petition by showing injury, causa-
tion, and redressability.96 There was evidence in the record that
the wind farm would pose a safety risk to pilots operating in
Nantucket Sound during foggy and otherwise inclement
weather, which often plagued the area.97 The court noted that
“[d]uring such times, there would be a ‘clear risk of collision
with the wind turbine generators.’”98 The chairman of the Barn-
stable airport submitted a report indicating that the “‘finely bal-
anced airspace over Nantucket Sound is already one of the most
congested, foggy, and dangerous airspaces on the eastern sea-
board.’”99 A group of air traffic controllers summed up the situ-
ation by stating that erecting the turbines in the area “would be
a ‘disaster waiting to happen.’”100
The court negated the argument that VFR pilots attempting
to operate in Nantucket Sound in inclement weather could sim-
ply circumnavigate the wind farm.101 After reviewing the volume
of traffic and its multiple layers, the CEO and President of Is-
land Airways indicated that such flight operations in the vicinity
of the wind farm would be “problematic because even horizon-
tal diversions of only one or two miles can further compress air
traffic into concentrated corridors.”102 The record before the
court indicated a “‘horizontal diversion around a 25 square mile
project would certainly lead to concentrated corridors of travel’
and thereby ‘increase the possibility of a collision.’”103 Finally,
the evidence in the record indicated that encroachment of es-
tablished VFR routes would clearly compromise the pilots’ abil-
93 Id. at 32.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 33.
96 See id. at 31.
97 Id. at 32.
98 Id. at 33.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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ity to implement collision avoidance procedures while in the
center of Nantucket Sound’s three airports.104
The petitioners made two arguments on the merits. The first
argument was that the FAA’s decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious because it departed from its internal guidelines.105 The
second argument was “that the FAA failed to fulfill its obliga-
tions under 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b).”106 In reversing the FAA, the
court found it only had to reach the first argument; that is, the
FAA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously.107
The court found that according to the FAA’s procedures for
handling airspace matters—specifically, FAA Order JO
7400.2G—the “FAA can find a hazard if the proposed structure
would have a ‘substantial adverse effect.’”108 The court identi-
fied that a substantial adverse effect existed if, under §§ 6-3-4
and 6-3-5 of FAA Order JO 7400.2G, the structure would impact
one or more aeronautical operations per day.109
In issuing its final order, the FAA ignored §§ 7-1-3, 6-3-5, and
6-3-4 of FAA Order JO 7400.2G and relied only on § 6-3-8(c)(1)
of FAA Order JO 7400.2G, which provided that “[a] structure
would have an adverse [aeronautical] effect upon VFR air navi-
gation if its height is greater than 500 feet above the surface at
its site, and within 2 statute miles of any regularly used VFR
route.”110 Taking § 6-3-8(c) of FAA Order JO 7400.2G totally out
of context, the FAA concluded that because the structures
would not be more than 500 feet AGL, they would not be an
obstruction to air navigation.111 In doing so, the FAA completely
ignored § 6-3-3 of FAA Order JO 7400.2G, which provided:
A structure is considered to have an adverse aeronautical effect if
it first exceeds the obstruction standards of part 77, and/or is
found to have physical or electromagnetic radiation effect on the
operation of air navigation facilities. A proposed or existing
structure, if not amended, altered, or removed, has an adverse
effect if it would:
. . . .
104 Id.
105 Id. at 34.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. (citing Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Order JO
7400.2G, § 7-1-3(e) (Apr. 10, 2008), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/me-
dia/Order/7400.2G.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT76-WEJZ]).
109 See id.
110 Id. at 35.
111 See id.
2021] PRIMER ON OPPOSING CONSTRUCTION 365
(b)  Require a VFR operation[ ] to change its regular flight
course or altitude.112
To be clear, the FAA relied solely on § 6-3-8(c)(1) of FAA Order
JO 7400.2G and concluded that the analysis of whether there
was a “substantial adverse effect” was unnecessary because the
wind turbines were less than 500 feet AGL.113 In vacating and
remanding the case to the FAA, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit declared:
The FAA repeatedly notes in its brief that the handbook “largely
consists of criteria rather than rules to follow.” . . . We agree. Any
sensible reading of the handbook, and of § 6-3-8(c) 1 in particu-
lar, would indicate there is more than one way in which the wind
farm can pose a hazard to VFR operations. Indeed, other sections
of the handbook, especially when read in light of some of the
evidence noted above, suggest that the project may very well be
such a hazard. Here, by abandoning its own established proce-
dure, . . . the FAA catapulted over the real issues and the analyti-
cal work required by its handbook.114
In Town of Barnstable v. FAA (Barnstable II),115 the FAA—on
remand from the decision in Barnstable I116—collected traffic
data and “hired the MITRE Corporation to assess the project’s
effects on VFR flights.”117 The traffic study ran from January
1–September 30, 2011, and found that 427 VFR flights of air-
craft equipped with transponders flew over the proposed loca-
tion of the wind farm at altitudes of 949 feet or below, “flights
that presumably would have had to change altitude or route had
the wind farm been in existence.”118 Throughout the nine-
month study, “the greatest number of transponder-equipped
VFR flights that passed over the turbines’ proposed location at
an altitude of 949 feet or below was nine and occurred three
times.”119 Some FAA-solicited public comments suggested, “that
any adjustments to flight paths or altitudes would be minor and
brief.”120 The FAA concluded that the construction of the wind
farm would have no adverse effect.121 The United States Court
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
115 740 F.3d 681 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
116 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
117 Barnstable II, 740 F.3d at 685.
118 Id. at 685–86 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(a), (c) (2021)).
119 Id. at 686.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,
declaring:
[T]he FAA on remand addressed the court’s concern in Barnst-
able I by hiring the MITRE Corporation to do a further study,
which found that most VFR flights would be over just four tur-
bines in one corner of the wind farm, and by seeking public com-
ments and responding to aeronautical objections to the wind
farm.122
D. THE DUTY OF THE FAA TO GIVE PUBLIC NOTICE OF THE
AERONAUTICAL STUDY
49 U.S.C. § 44718(a) requires the public to be given adequate
notice in relation to filing an FAA Form 7460–1.123 As is appar-
ent from a review of this article, the FAA does not conduct a
formal, on-the-record hearing but rather conducts an informal
adjudication.124 Because the FAA determinations result from an
informal adjudication, it is all the more urgent that the public
be made aware of the potential erection of structures that could
compromise or jeopardize the integrity or safety of a public-use
airport. In White Industries, Inc. v. FAA, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the FAA’s no hazard
determination because the agency failed to consider the com-
ments of Mr. White, who planned to build an airport.125 The
FAA refused to consider Mr. White’s comments on the theory
that the airport did not exist yet.126 However, the court reversed
the FAA finding that this was a factual determination and con-
cluded that the FAA arbitrarily made a determination without a
hearing.127 Reversing the FAA, the court declared:
The FAA made no findings of fact as to whether it received actual
notice of a proposed, public use airport and whether it promised
to provide petitioner, as an interested person, with the opportu-
nity to comment. Accordingly, we remand this case to the FAA
for an evidentiary hearing to rule on the factual issues raised by
the petitioner, in light of the correct legal standards.128
122 Id. at 689.
123 See 49 U.S.C. § 44718(a).
124 See, e.g., Clark Cnty. v. FAA, 522 F.3d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
125 White Industries, Inc. v. FAA, 692 F.2d 532, 533 (8th Cir. 1982).
126 See id. at 534 (Other arguments proffered by the FAA included that the
airport was not planned for public use and that the airport was not “the subject of
a notice or proposal on file with the FAA.”).
127 See id. at 534–35.
128 Id. at 535.
2021] PRIMER ON OPPOSING CONSTRUCTION 367
In BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc. v. FAA, the FAA failed
to circularize the notice required.129 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the peti-
tion, noting that the FAA was required to give notice of the aero-
nautical study but did not “explain its reasons for declining to
do so.”130 Accordingly, as a practice note, counsel for petitioners
before the United States Courts of Appeals will want to examine
the record to ascertain whether the FAA gave adequate notice of
the aeronautical study since failure to do so may be grounds for
reversal of the final order.
VI. CAN THE STATE ENJOIN CONSTRUCTION OF
STRUCTURES NEAR AIRPORTS AS A NUISANCE EVEN IF
THE FAA ISSUED A DETERMINATION OF NO HAZARD?
The weight of FAA’s determination of hazards on a proposed
project’s outcome depends on the jurisdiction. For example, in
the State of Iowa, the local airport zoning commission can bring
an action to enjoin the construction of a structure near an air-
port deemed a nuisance even if the FAA has issued a determina-
tion of no hazard.131 In Carroll Airport Commission v. Danner, the
Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed a district court decision which
held that a local airport commission had the authority to peti-
tion a twelve-story grain elevator erected near an airport for
abatement, even though the FAA had already issued a determi-
nation of no hazard.132 The Iowa Supreme Court declared,
On our de novo review, we determine that the Federal Aviation
Act allows for local zoning regulation, and the no-hazard letter
did not preempt the local airport zoning regulations as a matter
of law. We affirm the district court’s finding the structure consti-
tutes a threat to aviation requiring abatement.133
The structure in Danner was well within the local govern-
ment’s regulatory reach. The Danner farm that had constructed
the grain elevator sat in the flight path of the Arthur N. Neu
Municipal Airport, which the Carroll Airport Commission man-
aged.134 The structure at issue was 127 feet tall and stood within
129 BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc. v. FAA, 293 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
130 Id. at 532–33.
131 Carroll Airport Commission v. Danner, 927 N.W.2d 635, 639–40 (Iowa
2019).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 640.
134 Id.
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10,000 feet horizontally from the end of a runaway, making its
location within the airport’s “protected zone.”135 Additionally,
its height intruded sixty feet into restricted airspace.136
The initial misunderstanding by the farm owner and permit
issuer about compliance led to the grain elevator’s unfavorable
construction.137 The Danners had received a building permit
with an agriculture exemption from the county zoning ordi-
nances, but it “did not exempt the Danners from the airport
zoning ordinances.”138 The building permit application—com-
pleted by the Danners—even stated that “[a]ll farm buildings or
structures [were] subject to the Airport Zoning Ordinances
which regulate[ ] height and emissions in and around the air-
port air space as depicted on the attached diagram[.]”139 De-
spite the warning on the application, the court noted that
neither the Danners nor Carl Wilburn, the county zoning ad-
ministrator, were aware that the exemption did not include air-
port zoning regulations.140
Thus, the Carroll Airport Commission was not notified until
the grain elevator was already being built.141 Commissioner
Greg Siemann grew concerned when he noticed the construc-
tion and contacted Wilburn and Greg Schreck, the city zoning
commissioner.142 After learning about the issued permit and
misunderstanding, the Commission notified the Danners about
the variance requirement from the Airport Zoning Regulations
but informed them that it would not grant it nor allow a regula-
tion violation, and the Commission asked the FAA to conduct
an aeronautical study of the structure, including its impact on
aviation safety.143
The FAA’s determination after the study seemed to be ac-
cepted by both parties.144 The FAA issued a DNH in July of 2013,
finding that the structure exceeded obstruction standards, but it
would not be a hazard to air navigation if the Danners painted
135 See id. (“Local zoning ordinances mandate[d] a protected zone around the
airport that extends 10,000 feet horizontally from the end of [runways] . . . .”).
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 641.
144 See id.
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the structure and added red lights on top of it.145 The Airport
Commission did not seek judicial review of the FAA’s DNH, and
so the Danners complied with the FAA’s instruction.146 As an
added precaution, “[t]he FAA issued a ‘Notice to Airmen’
(NOTAM) that raised the minimum descent [altitude] for the
airport by 100 feet, requiring pilots to approach the airport at a
higher altitude.”147 Notably, however, the FAA warned the Dan-
ners in the no hazard letter that they were still not relieved from
complying with “any law, ordinance, or regulation of
any . . . local government body.”148
However, the Danners’ compliance with the FAA’s recom-
mendations did not protect them from the Airport Commis-
sion’s subsequent lawsuit. In July 2015, the Airport Commission
filed an action stating that the grain elevator “violated certain
building ordinances, city and county zoning ordinances, and air-
port commission regulations, and constituted a nuisance and
hazard to air traffic.”149 The Airport Commission sought equita-
ble relief in the form of an injunction requiring either the modi-
fication or removal of the grain elevator.150 In response, the
Danners demanded a jury trial and raised the affirmative de-
fense of federal preemption.151 The district court struck the jury
demand because the case was filed in equity, and the case pro-
ceeded to a bench trial.152
At trial, the Airport Commission’s arguments focused on air-
port safety whereas the Danners’ arguments focused on finan-
cial costs. The Airport Commission brought in the following five
witnesses: “C. Peter Crawford, the engineer for the airport; John
McLaughlin, a meteorologist, pilot, and flight instructor; Don-
ald Mensen, fixed base operator of the airport; Kevin Wittrock, a
commissioner and a pilot; and [Greg] Siemann, an attorney, pi-
lot, and commissioner.”153 The pilots spoke about their exper-
iences flying over the grain elevator and “expressed their
concerns for student pilots or pilots distracted while landing.”154
The Airport Commission presented testimony that also ad-
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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dressed costs—namely, the risk of losing federal grant money—
but the record indicated that the airport had received federal
grant funds even after the Danners erected the grain elevator.155
On the other hand, Loren Danner testified that the grain eleva-
tor’s total cost thus far was approximately $315,870.156 Further,
he estimated that the cost of tearing down the structure and
rebuilding it to comply with the ordinances would cost approxi-
mately $450,000.157
The district court ruled in favor of the Airport Commission
and determined that the FAA findings were not preemptive of
state or local zoning laws.158 The court found that the structure
was a nuisance and an airport hazard under state and local ordi-
nances, and it did not qualify for an agricultural exemption to
certain zoning laws.159 Rejecting the Danners’ affirmative de-
fense that the FAA DNH was preemptive, the court explained:
While the FAA regulations certainly do apply, the local county
regulations can also be in effect. The local regulations take a
more stringent stance on what a hazard is and how it could affect
the air space. If the FAA regulations contained all airport and
safety regulations there would be no need for the State to desig-
nate zoning powers to the Commission. The Court finds that
these regulations in fact work together and the FAA regulations
and letter sent do not preempt the local regulations.160
The district court gave no evidentiary weight to the FAA study
and DNH; instead, it ordered the structure to be removed or
modified according to local regulations.161 The Danners ap-
pealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court, concluding that the doctrines of express, implied, and
conflict preemption did not apply to the FAA DNH.162 The Dan-
ners then applied for review to the Iowa Supreme Court, which
was granted.163
The Iowa Supreme Court expanded the discussion on federal-
ism by analyzing the Federal Aviation Act and its scope. It
framed the issue as follows: “We must decide whether the FAA’s
155 Id.
156 See id.
157 Id. at 642.
158 See id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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no-hazard determination for the Danners’ grain leg preempts
state and local zoning ordinances limiting the height of struc-
tures in or near flight paths.”164 The Iowa Supreme Court first
observed that the purpose of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
was to have a single authority that would “frame rules for the
safe and efficient use of the nation’s airspace.”165 The court
cited 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1), which provides that the U.S. Gov-
ernment has exclusive sovereignty over the airspace in the
United States.166 The court then walked through the FAA’s pro-
cedures and legal bases to determine whether an object is an
airport hazard.167
The court’s view then turned to the counterargument that the
FAA determinations practically hold no legal effect. Referencing
the cases of Town of Barnstable v. FAA and Clark County v. FAA, it
judged that DNHs by the FAA had been successfully chal-
lenged.168 After considering both regulatory and statutory au-
thority, the court declared:
The State of Iowa and Carroll County each have enactments ad-
dressing airport hazards. Any city or county with an airport may
establish an airport commission to manage and control the air-
port. . . . These commissions have “all of the powers in relation to
airports granted to cities and counties under state law, except
powers to sell the airport.” . . . These powers include the author-
ity to make decisions with regard to zoning to prevent airport
hazards. . . . ”In the event of any conflict between any airport
zoning regulations adopted or established under this chapter
and any other regulations applicable to the same area, . . . the
more stringent limitation or requirement shall govern and
prevail.”169
The court quoted from Iowa Code § 329.2, which provided:
It is hereby found that an airport hazard endangers the lives and
property of users of the airport and of occupants of land and
other persons in its vicinity, and also, if of the obstruction type, in
effect reduces the size of the area available for the landing, tak-
ing off and maneuvering of aircraft, thus tending to destroy or
164 Id. at 643.
165 Id. (citation omitted); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(5) (“The Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing . . . regulations and minimum standards[.]”).
166 See Danner, 927 N.W.2d at 643.
167 See id. at 644–45.
168 Id. at 645.
169 Id. at 646 (citing IOWA CODE §§ 329.2–3, 329.8, 330.17(1), 330.21 (2021)).
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impair the utility of the airport and the public investment
therein. Accordingly, it is hereby declared:
1.  That the creation or establishment of an airport hazard is a
public nuisance and an injury to the community served by the
airport in question.
2.  That it is necessary in the interest of public health, safety,
and general welfare that the creation or establishment of air-
port hazards be prevented.
3.  That this should be accomplished, to the extent legally pos-
sible, by proper exercise of the police power.
4.  That the prevention of the creation or establishment of air-
port hazards, and the elimination, removal, alteration, mitiga-
tion, or marking and lighting of existing airport hazards are
public purposes for which municipalities may raise and ex-
pend public funds, as an incident to the operation of airports,
to acquire land or property interests therein.170
Similar to the lower courts, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected
the preemption defense. The Iowa Supreme Court reasoned
through the absence of express, conflict, and field preemp-
tion.171 First, there was no express preemption because the legis-
lation passed by Congress did not forbid states from regulating
public nuisances in relation to airports.172 Second, there was no
conflict preemption because no “conflict” existed between fed-
eral statutes regulating airspace and local ordinances forbidding
nuisances.173 Third, there was no field preemption since Con-
gress had not so thoroughly occupied the field as to preclude
state regulations concerning navigable airspace.174 The Iowa Su-
preme Court then declared:
On balance, we decline to hold the FAA no-hazard determina-
tion preempted enforcement of local zoning requirements. We
reiterate that “[t]here is a presumption against preemp-
tion.” . . . Federal courts recognize that the FAA’s “hazard/no-
hazard determination has no enforceable legal effect” and “[t]he
FAA is not empowered to prohibit or limit proposed construc-
tion it deems dangerous to air navigation.” . . . Accordingly, that
role must fall to state and local government, indicating Congress
left room for “cooperative federalism.” . . . In our view, the better
reasoned authorities discussed above hold state and local regula-
tors can impose stricter height restrictions on structures in flight
170 Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 329.2 (2021)).
171 See id. at 649–53.
172 See id. at 649.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 650–53.
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paths notwithstanding an FAA no-hazard determination. Finally,
we rely on the very language of this specific no-hazard determina-
tion, which expressly warned the Danners that they still must
comply with state and local laws.175
Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the injunction
that the district court had granted.176 Although the Danners did
not receive a favorable ruling, the court vacated the $200 per
day penalty imposed by the district court that had been accruing
during the appeals process.177 It noted that the Danners raised a
matter of first impression as to whether the determination of no
hazard had a preemptive effect, and they had pursued the ap-
peal in good faith and with objective reasonableness.178
While determinations of no hazard do not have a preemptive
effect in Iowa, they do have a preemptive effect in California. In
Citizens Opposing a Dangerous Environment v. County of Kern, a pub-
lic interest group filed a petition of mandamus challenging the
county’s certification of an environmental impact report issued
for the construction of a wind farm project near a private air-
port.179 North Sky River Energy, LLC, and Jawbone Wind En-
ergy, LLC—the proponents—requested the construction of 116
wind turbine generators on ridges near the airport, which would
block or severely limit the use of two of the three primary ap-
proaches to the airport.180 Gliders traditionally employed the
ridgelines to receive additional lift on their return trip to the
airport.181 Placing the wind turbine generators on top of the
ridgelines would increase the height of the obstruction, elimi-
nating a glider pilot’s ability to safely use the ridgeline and de-
creasing the margins of safety to land at the airport.182
In contrast to Danner, the local board of zoning supervisors in
Citizens Opposing a Dangerous Environment supported the con-
struction and were backed by the FAA’s determination of no
hazard. In fact, the proponents of the 116 wind turbine genera-
tors had filed FAA Form 7460–1, but the owner of the private
airport was never contacted by the FAA, was never invited to sub-
175 Id. at 653 (citing Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Iowa 2014);
Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass’n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965, 966–67 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 83 (Iowa 2014)).
176 Id. at 655.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
180 See id. at 688, 691.
181 Id. at 691.
182 Id. at 691–92.
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mit comments to the safety analysis performed by the FAA, and
never received copies of the determinations allegedly issued by
the FAA—all in direct violation of the formal process, proce-
dures, and protocols required by the operating rules and poli-
cies of the FAA.183 In response to the airport owner’s concerns,
an expert for the proponents maintained that the same protec-
tions were not available because the airport was a private airport
and not a public-use airport.184 The expert also discussed how
the OEG coordinates with and informs other offices of the FAA
by “auto-screening” to prove that the relevant federal offices
were automatically notified and that it was not necessary to cir-
cularize the cases.185 The Kern County Board of Supervisors also
indicated that it relied upon measure 4.8-8, a local hazard miti-
gation procedure, in conducting their analysis.186 The Kern
County Board of Supervisors had approved the erection of the
wind turbine generators on the theory that measure 4.8-8 re-
quired the proponents to file an FAA Form 7460–1 and obtain a
determination of no hazard from the FAA, and that if there was
a hazard, the proponents were responsible for mitigating the
hazard.187
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Kern County Board of Supervisors, which permitted the wind
turbine generator project to go forward.188 The court held that
“federal law occupies the entire field of aviation safety”189
against the public interest group’s argument that the Kern
County Board of Supervisors had “hid[ ] behind the fig leaf of a
non-existent federal preemption.”190 However, the court did ac-
knowledge that the FAA does not have the authority to enforce
hazards versus no hazard determinations, and it explained the
weight of those determinations in the local context:
“[A] hazard/no-hazard determination . . . has substantial practi-
cal impact” . . . because it “can hinder the project sponsor in
acquiring insurance, securing financing or obtaining approval from
state or local authorities.” . . . Thus, while the FAA could not halt
183 Id. at 692.
184 Id. at 693.
185 See id. at 693, 697 (“No evidence has been submitted into the record by the
FAA indicating that additional information is necessary at this time . . . .”).
186 See id. at 686.
187 See id. at 695.
188 See id. at 686–87.
189 Id. at 701 (quoting Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir.
2007)).
190 Id.
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construction of North Sky River’s and Jawbone’s WTG’s if it
deemed those structures hazardous, under measure 4.8-8 the
County was bound to do so through the exercise of its police
power.191
Even though this case is adverse to the interest of the aviation
community, in footnote 8 of the opinion, the court agreed to
take judicial notice of FAA Order No. JO 7400.2H.192
VII. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of wind turbine generators in the vicinity of
public-use airports is a concern to the aviation community. Air-
craft Owners and Pilots Association Communications Coordina-
tor Amelia Walsh has reported that Cedric County, Kansas has
voted to “disallow[ ] wind turbine development within 10 miles
of any county airport.”193 In terms of whether federal preemp-
tion precludes state and local authorities from exercising their
police powers to prevent obstructions from being erected in nav-
igable airspace, Iowa’s decision in Carroll Airport Commission v.
Danner is more logical from both a public policy and legal stand-
point than the rule followed by California in Citizens Opposing a
Dangerous Environment v. County of Kern. While Congress dele-
gated the authority to promulgate rules and regulations dealing
with airspace to the FAA, Congress did not intend to become
involved in every local dispute. Those matters are uniquely of
local concern. For that reason, the Supreme Court of Iowa
made the correct determination in Carroll Airport Commission v.
Danner.194
Therefore, actors in the legal system should amply prepare
and adequately inform themselves. Courts called upon to deter-
mine whether state and local authorities retain the authority to
prohibit the erection of structures in navigable airspace should
rely on the ruling of the Supreme Court of Iowa: FAA statutory
and regulatory authority does not preempt local zoning require-
ments, especially since they may be more stringent than those of
the FAA. Counselors forced to litigate the matter in the federal
court system should thoroughly understand the imaginary sur-
191 Id. at 702 (citations omitted).
192 Id. at 688 n.8.
193 Amelia Walsh, Kansas County Blocks Wind Turbines to Protect Aviation, AIR-
CRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-
media/all-news/2019/August/30/wind-turbines-no-longer-a-threat-for-Wichita-
pilots [https://perma.cc/P2PF-3JVL].
194 See supra note 175.
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faces provided in 14 C.F.R. § 77.19, the obstruction standards
set out in 14 C.F.R. § 77.17, and the most recent FAA Order on
Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters. A counselor’s careful
analysis of the regulations and the FAA’s Orders on Procedures
for Handling Airspace Matters may very well indicate that the
FAA did not apply its standards correctly or did not provide a
reasoned decision. Such a finding may justify a United States
Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse any final order issued by the
FAA Administrator concerning the erection of wind turbine
generators near a public-use airport.195
If the past is prologue, we can reasonably anticipate more pro-
ponents of wind turbine generators will be seeking to erect
those structures near or in the vicinity of public-use airports.
Hopefully, the materials set forth above will aid aviation inter-
ests in their efforts to preserve and protect navigable airspace
near public-use airports.
195 See, e.g., Clark Cnty. v. FAA, 522 F.3d 437, 438–39 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Town of
Barnstable v. FAA, 659 F.3d 28, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
